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R = P(q)z + H, where P(q) =	{	
P,     if	q	≥	Q and












w = A + az + βq,





























8	 our	results	also	hold	for	interdependent	effort	costs,	given	that	cost	interaction	is	not	too	strong.PAying for PErformAncE in hosPitAls
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   s.t.   af = ca(a,b)
   ß = cb(a,b).
The	first-order	conditions	of	the	manager’s	optimization	problem	read:9	
9	 Expected	revenue	is
	 E[zP(q)]	=	E[z]	E[P(q)]	=	f [aP(1	–	G (Q –	b))	+	G(Q	–	b)]	=	f2a(1	+	(P	–	1)(1	–	G(Q	–	ß)))	
E[w]

























Q =	E[q] = b = ß ≥	0,	 (3)
where	the	second	equality	follows	from	the	assumption	on	quality	noise	and	the	third	from	
the	physician’s	first-order	condition	(1).
In	order	to	induce	the	manager	to	offer	ß = b = Q,	the	sponsor	must	set	the	bonus	P	such	
that	the	first-order	conditions	of	the	manager	(2)	are	satisfied.	Inserting	ß = Q,	G(Q	–	ß)	=	1/2,	
and	g(Q – ß)	=	1/	 2Éσ q 	and	solving	for	α and	ß,	we	obtain
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Proposition 1: To implement the quality standard Q in expectation, the sponsor offers a bonus
	 (6)




















Proposition 2 The bonus P* that implements the quality standard Q ≥ 0	in expectation is 














positive	degrees	of	risk	aversion,	r > 0,	it	strictly	increases	in	quality noise	even	in	the	absence	
of	risk	aversion,	i.e.	for	all	r ≥ 0	(given	Q > 0).	The	reason	is	the	following:	treatment	noise	only	
takes	effect	via	the	physician’s	risk	aversion;	quality	noise	enters	both	through	the	physician’s	











Proposition 3 The sponsor offers the hospital a block grant
	 (8)
The	block	grant	has	the	following	properties:	





	 (iii)	 there	exists	Q* >	0	such	that	H⁅(Q)	<	0	for	Q < Q*	and	H⁅(Q)	≥	0	for	Q ≥ Q*,	
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3.2 Comparative Statics on Incentives
After	calculating	the	optimal	reimbursement	scheme,	we	now	present	comparative	statics	
results	on	the	optimal	incentives.	resubstituting	P*	into	equations	(4),	and	(5),	we	obtain:
Proposition 4 (a) The physician’s incentive to treat patients reads 
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for	low	levels	of	the	quality	standard,	Q∈(ξv/Kq, (ξ + 1)v/(2Kq)) the	latter	for	higher	levels,	




Proposition 6 The equilibrium incentive for treatments, α, decreases with the direct quality 





































of	the	number	of	treatments	(e.g.	when	remuneration	takes	the	form	of	R = E[z]	+ P · E[q]).	
one	can	show	that	in	this	case	the	hospital’s	equilibrium	profit	is	unbounded	in	Q	(see	the	
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VII.	APPEndIx
The	appendix	contains	the	proofs.




f 4(P –	1) g(Q – β) [1 + (P – 1)	(1 – G(Q – β))] = βKqKz.	 (12)
Evaluating	both	sides	of	the	equation	at	β	=	0,	we	have
f 4(P –	1) g(Q – β) [1 + (P – 1)	(1 – G(Q))]	>	0 




Proof of Proposition 2
The	payer’s	reimbursement	price	needed	to	implement	an	arbitrary	quality	standard	Q	is	given	by








Proof of Proposition 3.
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and


























4 +4 ÉKqKzσ q
2 f




Proof of Proposition 4












Proof of Proposition 5.
What	is	left	to	prove	is	the	last	claim,	i.e.	the	reimbursement	price	increases	with	the	hospital’s	
quality	concern	ξ	if	and	only	if	 	This	claim	follows	from
Proof of Proposition 6.
Inserting	the	Q-implementing	price	P*
ξ	from	equation	(11)	in	the	equilibrium	incentive	for	


































Hospital profit under direct quality incentives (Section	V)
We	end	with	showing	that	the	hospital’s	equilibrium	profit	is	unbounded	in	the	quality	standard	
Q when	reimbursement	incorporates	direct	quality	incentives.	Specifically,	suppose	that
R = E[z] + P · E[q],



















E[z] + P ·E[q] – (A	+ αE[z] + ßE[q]
=	(fα + Pb) – (A	+ αf α+ ßb)
=	(αf 2 + Pß)	–	(A + α2f 2 + ß2)
which	is	unbounded	in	Q.
).